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Abstract This paper presents a case study of the English noun amount, a word that
ostensibly relies on measurement in its semantics, yet stands apart from other quan-
tizing nouns on the basis of its EXISTENTIAL interpretation. John ate the amount of
apples that Bill ate does not mean John and Bill ate the same apples, but rather that
they each ate apples in the same quantity. Amount makes reference to abstract rep-
resentations of measurement, that is, to degrees. Its EXISTENTIAL interpretation
evidences the fact that degrees contain information about the objects that instan-
tiate them. Outside the domain of nominal measurement, the noun kind exhibits
behavior strikingly similar to that of amount; both yield an EXISTENTIAL inter-
pretation (Carlson 1977b). This observation motivates re-conceiving of degrees as
nominalized quantity-uniform properties—the same sort of entity as kinds. Thus,
the semantic machinery handling kinds also handles degrees (e.g., Derived Kind
Predication; Chierchia 1998): As nominalized properties, degrees are instantiated
by objects that hold the corresponding property; when instantiated by real-world
objects, degrees (and kinds) deliver the EXISTENTIAL interpretation.
Keywords: measurement, degrees, kinds
1 Introduction
English possesses a class of nouns, call them ‘quantizing’ nouns, that perform or
facilitate measurement. Among this broad class of quantizing nouns, subclasses
emerge on the basis of interpretation and function. There are container nouns like
glass or bowl, measure terms like kilo or liter, and atomizers like grain or pile.
There are also nouns that make direct reference to abstract representations of mea-
surement (i.e., degrees), for example size or width.1 Most versatile of these degree
nouns is the word amount, whose semantics is the current object of investigation.
The word amount admits both DEFINITE and EXISTENTIAL interpretations. In
(1), suppose the addressee bought three apples; under the DEFINITE interpretation,
∗ This paper is a development of (a portion of) the ideas presented in Scontras 2014, and the peo-
ple thanked there deserve credit (but not blame) here as well. Special thanks are due to Gennaro
Chierchia. Thanks also to the audience and organizers of SALT 24.
1 For discussion of the full typology of quantizing nouns, see Scontras 2014 and references therein.
©2014 Scontras
Amount semantics
the sentence asserts that John ate those three apples that the addressee bought. In
(2), suppose the addressee ate three apples. Rather than making the implausible
(and grotesque) claim that John ate the same apples that the addressee ate, (2) as-
serts that John ate three apples, a plurality equal in amount to the apples eaten by
the addressee. Here is the EXISTENTIAL interpretation of amount.
(1) John ate the amount of apples that you bought.
→֒ John ate the apples that the addressee bought (DEFINITE)
(2) John ate the amount of apples that you ate.
→֒ there were some apples that John ate equal in amount to the apples that
the addressee ate (EXISTENTIAL)
In both (1) and (2), definite amount composes with a bare plural substance noun
(i.e., apples) and gets modified by a relative clause. Despite their superficial simi-
larities, these two uses of amount yield drastically different interpretations. In the
first, DEFINITE use, amount makes direct reference to a concrete plurality of apples;
amount merely establishes a partition on the denotation of apples. In the second,
amount references an abstract amount—a degree—determined on the basis of a
measure; this abstract amount gets instantiated by different objects (i.e., by plural-
ities of apples), which are acted on accordingly. Under the second interpretation
of amount, apples are referenced only indirectly, through their ability to instanti-
ate an abstract representation of measurement (i.e., to number three).2 This paper
develops a semantics that delivers this EXISTENTIAL interpretation for amount.
1.1 A puzzle: The EXISTENTIAL interpretation of amount
The sentence in (3) provides another example of the EXISTENTIAL interpretation.
In (3), it is highly unlikely that the speaker eats the same apples every day. Instead,
the sentence appeals to an abstract amount determined on the basis of a measure,
and makes claims about objects that instantiate those amounts. For example, sup-
pose a dietary regimen mandates the eating of two kilos of apples each day; that
amount of apples in (3) could refer to that abstract amount, two kilos, which was
differently instantiated by apples each day. In other words, the speaker ate different
apples each day, but each day the apples that the speaker ate measured two kilos.
(3) I ate that amount of apples every day for a year.
The abstract representations of measurement to which amount refers are degrees;
within the class of quantizing nouns, amount inhabits the subclass of degree nouns.
2 See Cartwright 1970 for a similar observation, which she attributes to Russell 1938.
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Amount is not alone in its status as a degree noun; other nouns that fall within
this class include size and length and weight (a subset of what Partee (1987) calls
“attribute” nouns). Compare (3) with the sentences in (4); they all share the ability
to reference objects indirectly via an abstract measurement. Under the EXISTEN-
TIAL reading of (4a), the speaker does not sell and buy back the same piece of rope
each day, but rather sells different pieces of rope that measure the same length.
(4) a. I sold that length of rope every day for a year.
b. I bought that size (of) shirt for my entire life.3
Degree nouns stand out among the typology of quantizing nouns. While amount
in (3) admits an EXISTENTIAL interpretation, the quantizing nouns in (5) only allow
for a DEFINITE construal. For example, (5a) makes the odd assertion that John spent
at least a year drinking a single glass of wine, taking minuscule sips each day.
(5) No EXISTENTIAL interpretation for other quantizing nouns:
a. ✗ John drank that glass of wine every day for a year. (container)
b. ✗ John bought that kilo of potatoes every day for a year. (measure)
c. ✗ John dropped that grain of rice every day for a year. (atomizer)
However, outside the domain of quantizing nouns, the behavior of the noun kind and
other kind-denoting nominals parallels that of amount: kind-denoting nominals also
yield EXISTENTIAL interpretations. For example, (6) asserts not that John spent a
year drinking some salient quantity of wine (cf. (5a)), but rather that he drank many
instances of some salient kind of wine (say, a specific vintage).
(6) John drank that kind of wine every day for a year.
Compare that amount of apples with that kind of wine. In the case of amount,
we reference abstract representations of measurement that get instantiated by real-
world objects (e.g., by pluralities of apples). With kind, we name a sortal concept—
a nominalized property—that gets instantiated by real-world objects (e.g., by quan-
tities of wine). It would seem, then, that the degrees to which amount refers are
aligned with kinds in the semantics: both behave as properties—the property of
being a type of wine, or of being three kilos of apples—which can be instantiated.
The task is to derive the EXISTENTIAL interpretation for amount in a way that
tracks these similarities with kind. Doing so will force a reevaluation of our under-
standing of degrees. But first, a review of the semantics of kinds.
3 Size may compose directly with the substance noun, without an intervening of, supporting the claim
made below that degree nouns take the substance noun as an argument. Why the other degree nouns
preserve the particle of remains an open question. See Zamparelli 1998 for further discussion.
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1.2 Some background: The EXISTENTIAL interpretation of kinds
Nouns lead dual lives. Under one guise, they are function-like properties that serve
as predicates, which delimit a class of objects that hold the relevant property. For
example, in (7), the noun bears names the set of bears and the existential construc-
tion is used to assert that John likes some members of that set.
(7) There are bears in the zoo that John likes.
Under another guise, nouns are argumental: they name individuals directly. In (8),
the sentence ascribes the property of being widespread not to individual bears, or
even to collections thereof, but to the bear kind—intuitively, to the species itself.
(8) Bears are widespread.
Since the groundbreaking study of Carlson (1977b), we have come to under-
stand the complex behavior of kinds. Take the DOG kind. It corresponds to the
property of being a dog. Dogs instantiate the dog property. Formally, kinds are
built from properties via a process of nominalization via the ‘down’ operator ∩,
defined as in (9) (see Chierchia 1998 for discussion).4 The DOG kind is the individ-
ual correlate of the property of being a dog—the totality of dogs in a given world.
Kinds behave as individuals because they are individuals; the domain of kinds, Dk,
is a subset of the domain of individuals, De. As individuals, kinds get referenced
and serve as arguments to predicates.
(9) For any property P and world/situation s,
∩P =
{
λ s. ιPs, if λ s. ιPs is in K (the set of kinds)
undefined, otherwise
where Ps is the extension of P in s.
Just as kinds may be constructed from properties via nominalization, properties
may be retrieved from kinds via predicativization. The ‘up’ operator ∪ applies to
a kind and returns the property that characterizes the kind. Applied to the DOG
kind, ∪ returns the property of being a dog. Chierchia (1998: 349) schematizes the
4 The term ‘kind’ is used here rather liberally: any nominalized, sortal property formed on the basis
of a semantically plural predicate (closed under sum formation via the *-operator) will count as
a generalized kind, or ‘kind’ for short. Collapsing over the distinction between what are at times
called ‘law-like’, ‘conventional’, or ‘established’ kinds and sortal concepts should not be taken as
a dismissal of this distinction. Established kinds like BEAR stand apart from sortal concepts like
BEARS JOHN LIKES on the basis of two phenomena: 1) established kinds but not sortal concepts
may serve as arguments to kind-level predicates, and 2) established kinds but not sortal concepts
exhibit scopelessness in episodic sentences. For fuller discussion of this distinction, see Carlson
1977b; Dayal 1992; Chierchia 1998.
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‘down’
∩
P K
∪
‘up’
Figure 1 Diagram of property–kind correspondence from Chierchia 1998
relationship between properties and kinds in Fig. 1.
It bears repeating that the set of kinds is a subset of the domain of individuals.
Fido is a dog; he is also an individual. The DOG kind is the individual correlate of
the property of being a dog; it, too, is an (intensionalized) individual. When the
DOG kind serves as the argument to kind-level predicates, as in (8) and (10), we
reference the kind and attribute properties directly to it.
(10) Dogs are extinct.
→֒ extinct(DOG) (where DOG corresponds to ∩λx. *dog(x), the kind)
To compose a kind with a non-kind-selecting predicate—that is, a predicate
that applies to real-world objects—the construction must undergo a type adjust-
ment similar to noun-incorporation (see van Geenhoven 1998). What results is the
EXISTENTIAL interpretation: the predicate quantifies existentially over instances of
the kind. Chierchia (1998) terms this process Derived Kind Predication (DKP):
(11) Derived Kind Predication:
If P applies to objects and k denotes a kind, then P(k) = ∃x[∪k(x) ∧ P(x)]
Instead of ascribing a property to the entire DOG kind, the sentence in (12) asserts
that there is an instance of the DOG kind (i.e., dogs) that is barking. The sentence
asserts that there exists an instance of the kind that holds the property of barking.
(12) [[Dogs are barking outside my window]]
= barking-outside-my-window(DOG)
via DKP
= ∃x[∪DOG(x) ∧ barking-outside-my-window(x)]
DKP applies at the level of the predicate barking outside my window, an object-
level predicate (dogs, not species, bark). The result is existential quantification over
members of the DOG kind. Here is the EXISTENTIAL interpretation. Moreover,
DKP applying at the level of the predicate delivers the scopelessness (i.e., obligatory
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narrow scope) of kinds in episodic sentences (Carlson 1977b; Chierchia 1998).
Next, consider the behavior of the noun kind, as in that kind of dog. In the
general case, kind composes with a kind-denoting nominal and returns its subkinds
(Zamparelli 1998). Composing with dog, kind returns a set of dog kinds, for exam-
ple dog breeds. These subkinds are individual correlates of the properties of being
a certain kind of dog. A candidate denotation for kind of dog appears in (13).5
(13) a. [[kind]] = λgλk. SUBKIND f (g)(k)
b. [[kind of dog]] = λk. subkind(DOG)(k)
c. [[kind of dog]] =


∩λx. *bulldog(x)
∩λx. *collie(x)
∩λx. *poodle(x)
...


d. [[that kind of dog]] = ∩λx. *bulldog(x) = BULLDOG
Just like dogs refers to the DOG kind in (12), that kind of dog refers to a kind (i.e., the
BULLDOG kind) in (13). In (14), composition proceeds in the same fashion: DKP
applies at the level of the predicate to allow that kind of dog to serve as an argument
to the object-level predicate barking. What results is the EXISTENTIAL interpreta-
tion, which asserts that instances of the relevant kind hold the named property.
(14) [[That kind of dog is barking. . . ]]
= barking(BULLDOG)
via DKP
= ∃x[∪BULLDOG(x) ∧ barking(x)]
To repeat: the EXISTENTIAL interpretation arises when a kind—a nominalized
property—attempts to compose with an object-level predicate. For this composi-
tion to proceed, the predicate quantifies existentially over instances of the kind.
Next, we turn to the EXISTENTIAL interpretation for amount and degrees.
2 A new kind of degree
In uttering (15), the speaker references an abstract amount and asserts that the
amount was instantiated each day by apples, which got eaten. But what are amounts,
and, crucially, how are they instantiated by real-world objects?
5 The SUBKIND f function returns a set of subkinds along a given dimension of evaluation. For ex-
ample, it could return a set of dog breeds, or a set of dog sizes, ages, etc. See Carlson 1977b for
discussion.
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(15) I ate that amount of apples every day for a year.
→֒ every day for a year I ate apples that measured the relevant amount
Amounts are extents along a scale; they are degrees, for example, three kilos or four
feet. Minimally, degrees contain information that determines points on a scale: a
measure function µ and a value n in its range. Degrees get instantiated by the ob-
jects that hold them: apples weighing three kilos, trees reaching four feet in height,
etc. In other words, the degree indicated by that amount of apples instantiates as
any set of apples that evaluates to the appropriate value with respect to the relevant
measure, that is, that reaches the specified extent along the given scale.
The language used to describe the referents of amount and their behavior in
the sentences that embed it reveals the strategy for formalizing amount’s seman-
tics: amount references abstract representations of measurement which may be in-
stantiated by objects in the world. Note the striking parallel with the semantics
of kinds: abstract entities corresponding to properties, which are defined in terms
of the objects that instantiate them. Moreover, the paradigmatic names for these
sorts of entities exhibit similar behavior: both amount and kind admit EXISTEN-
TIAL interpretations whereby real-world objects that instantiate salient properties
are indicated by the use of these terms. Here is the explanation for this overlap in
behavior: amount refers to a set of degrees; kind to a set of kinds. Degrees, like
kinds, are the individual correlates of properties of individuals; kinds and degrees
are the same sort of entity. Put simply, degrees are kinds.
Using a different set of data, Anderson & Morzycki (2012) arrive at a similar
conclusion, namely that degrees are kinds. Focusing on modification as it relates to
degrees, manners, and kinds, they show a broad range of functional elements that
appear to apply to all three sorts of entities, for example English how, as, and such.
They also note the behavior of the Polish anaphoric expression tak, which refers
to kinds, manners, and degrees. The authors’ conclusion is couched in a Neo-
Davidsonian framework: degrees are kinds of states. While the proposal developed
here is in principle compatible with Anderson & Morzycki’s approach, the current
analysis makes do without appeal to events or states; our degrees are of a different
sort.
Degrees are abstract representations of measurement. These representations be-
have as individuals: speakers may reference degrees and provide them as arguments
to predicates (e.g., That amount of apples is too much). Furthermore, degrees cor-
respond to properties: sets of individuals holding the relevant degree. When a pred-
icate applies to objects and composes with a degree, speakers make claims about
objects that instantiate the relevant degrees via an EXISTENTIAL reading. Amount
behaves like kind because both terms denotes entities of the same sort: nominalized
properties. The same semantic machinery handles both kinds and degrees: an EX-
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ISTENTIAL reading results when a nominalized property serves as the argument to
an object-level predicate and a type-shift like DKP mediates their composition.
But what sort of property begets a degree? Because they are abstract repre-
sentations of measurement, degrees must be built from properties whose semantics
appeals to a measure. In its simplest form, a degree is the nominalization of a
property defined on the basis of a measure, as in (16).6
(16) DEGREE := ∩λx. µ f (x) = n
Setting µ f to the kilogram measure, µkg, and its value n to 3 yields the three kilo
degree in (17). This degree is the individual correlate of the property of weighing
three kilos; predicativising (17) via ∪ returns the set of things that weigh three kilos.
(17) ∩λx. µkg(x) = 3
Note that the property from which a degree is built is quantity-uniform with respect
to the measure µ f specified in the property’s semantics: everything holding this
property evaluates to the same n with respect to µ f . In (17), every object holding
the de-nominalized property weighs the same: three kilos.
Degrees are the nominalizations of quantity-uniform properties. Three kilos qua
degree is the individual correlate of the property something holds when it weighs
three kilos. Similarly, that amount is the individual correlate of the property some-
thing holds when it measures the appropriate amount. As individuals, degrees enter
into semantic computation as arguments. Composing with a predicate that may
apply directly to degrees, that amount yields a DIRECT interpretation in parallel
to the interpretation resulting from a kind composing with kind-level predicates—
compare (18) with (10).
(18) (pointing to a signboard at a farm stand) That amount is the largest.
By predicativizing them via ∪ (as in DKP), degrees grant access to the individuals
that instantiate them. Hence, degrees also admit an EXISTENTIAL interpretation.
Finally, the denotation of amount: the noun denotes a set of degrees, nomi-
nalized quantity-uniform properties formed on the basis of a contextually-specified
measure. As with kind, amount behaves like a transitive noun, relating a kind with
amounts thereof. Echoing Zamparelli (1998), an amount is always an amount of
something. Rarely does one find bare amount, that is, an instance of the degree
noun without a substance noun like apples specifying what the amounts are of.
6 Building on the analysis of amount presented below, this degree template should contain two addi-
tional pieces of information: a kind k delimiting the class of things to which the degree may apply
(e.g., apples), and a contextually-supported instantiation of this kind, pi . Without the space to fully
motivate these elements of the analysis, they are omitted. See Scontras 2014 for discussion.
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When amount appears bare, a substance noun gets assumed. The substance noun,
a bare plural or mass term (e.g., apples), serves as an argument of amount. The
degrees referenced by amount are tied to the kind supplied by the substance noun.
This move ensures that the degrees to which amount refers are both quantity- and
quality-uniform. To make available salient concrete portions of the substance for
measurement, the partitioning instantiation operator pi returns maximal instances
of a kind supported by context. For present purposes, translate pi as the predica-
tivization operator ∪ (but see Scontras 2014 for fuller discussion). (19) exemplifies
a quantity- and quality-uniform degree: every member of the denominalized prop-
erty is an instance of the APPLE kind evaluating to the same n with respect to µ f .
(19) ∩λx. µ f (x) = n ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)
(20) [[amount]] = λkλd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µ f (x) = n ∧ pi(k)(x)]
where µ f is a contextually-specified measure,
n is some number in the range of the measure µ f ,
and pi is a contextually-supplied partitioning instantiation of k
In (20), transitive amount first takes the kind-denoting substance noun, retrieves the
kind’s maximal instances, then relates this partitioned set of instances to a set of
quantity- and quality-uniform degrees. Amounts are thus always of something.
As with kind, amount receives a relational semantics under which it takes a
kind-denoting substance noun as an argument and relates the kind with a set of
nominalized properties, that is, with a set of degrees. Building degrees from prop-
erties permits access to the holders of those properties like with the instantiations of
a kind. Thus, (15) references an amount (i.e., a degree) and asserts that this degree
was variously instantiated by apples, which were eaten each day over the course of
a year. This instantiation process proceeds with degrees just as it did with kinds: via
existential quantification over the members of denominalized degrees. The mecha-
nism remains DKP, generalized in (21) to apply to both kinds and degrees.
(21) Generalized DKP:
If P apples to objects and y denotes a nominalized property, then
P(y) = ∃x[∪y(x) ∧ P(x)]
A simplified derivation for the sentence in (15) appears in (22). Two features are
crucial: first, that amount of apples denotes a degree; second, this degree composes
with the object-level predicate eat via Generalized DKP. The result is an EXIS-
TENTIAL interpretation; the speaker asserts that there was an instantiation of the
amount-of-apples degree that he ate. The specific apples are irrelevant.
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(22) [[I ate that amount of apples. . . ]]
= ate(that-amount-of-apples)(I)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃x[∪that-amount-of-apples(x) ∧ ate(x)(I)]
Taking seriously the similarities in behavior between amount and kind suggests
a kind semantics for degrees. Degrees, like kinds, are the individual correlates of
properties, for example the property of attaining a certain degree (e.g., weighing
3 kilos) or belonging to a specific kind (e.g., being a poodle). Associating degrees
with properties permits access to the objects that instantiate them, just as associating
kinds with properties grants access to their members; the EXISTENTIAL interpreta-
tion results. Taking degrees as semantic primitives that merely indicate points on a
scale (e.g., Kennedy 1999), there is no hope of deriving the EXISTENTIAL interpre-
tation that characterizes amount. A point-on-scale analysis of degrees also misses
the generalization that captures the striking similarity in behavior between amount
and kind: both nouns reference nominalized properties. The next step is to specify
how the internal composition of, say, that amount of apples proceeds such that the
result is a degree.
3 Degrees in the compositional semantics
To review: amount relates a kind-denoting substance noun with a set of amounts of
that substance. This set is a set of degrees; degrees are conceived of as nominalized
quantity-uniform properties formed on the basis of a measure. Amount is highly
context-sensitive, such that this measure µ f and its value n are contextually deter-
mined. Additionally, the partitioning function pi that returns maximal instances of
the substance noun receives its specification from context. The resulting denotation
for the phrase amount of apples appears in (23).
(23) a. [[amount]] = λkλd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µ f (x) = n ∧ pi(k)(x)]
b. [[amount of apples]] = λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µ f (x) = n ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)]
Amount inhabits the subclass of degree nouns, which stand apart from other quan-
tizing nouns in their ability to yield an EXISTENTIAL interpretation. Kind and other
kind-denoting nominals pattern with amount and deliver the EXISTENTIAL interpre-
tation in episodic contexts. Both kinds and degrees track the objects that instantiate
them. Hence the conception of degrees, like kinds, as nominalized properties.
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3.1 Referencing degrees
Having settled on a semantics for amount, the task now is to determine how this
semantics interacts with the structures that embed amount to yield reference to spe-
cific degrees. Consider amount of apples. The substance noun is an argument of
amount, which projects a transitive structure. The particle of makes no semantic
contribution (recall its optionality with other degree nouns). By composing with its
substance noun argument and contextually determining the measure in its seman-
tics, amount returns a set of nominalized quantity- and quality-uniform properties.
This set is a set of degrees, ordered on the basis of a measure. In (24), suppose
context sets this measure to µkg. The result is a set of kilograms-of-apples degrees.
(24) [[amount of apples]] = λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)]
[[amount of apples]] =


∩λx. µkg(x) = 1 ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)
∩λx. µkg(x) = 2 ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)
∩λx. µkg(x) = 3 ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)
...


How does one get from a set of degrees the relevant degree? That is, how does
one arrive at a single degree from the NP denotation in (24)? Consider the behavior
of amount of apples when it serves as the argument of the demonstrative that.
(25) John bought that amount of apples.
Here is a situation in which the sentence in (25) may be uttered felicitously: some
apples sit on a table; the speaker points to these apples, and intends an EXISTEN-
TIAL interpretation. The speaker conveys that John bought some apples equal in
amount to the apples to which the speaker points. Suppose amount of apples de-
notes a set of kilograms-of-apples degrees as in (24), and there are three kilograms
of apples on the table. The demonstrative that takes the set of degrees in (24) and
returns the maximal degree that applies to those apples on the table. The degree is
accessed through the objects that instantiate it. This process obtains for that when
it composes with nominalized properties elsewhere (see Partee 1987): through the
indicated object that instantiates it, we access the (nominalized) property.
(26) a. I love that color of shirt!
b. That style of art never took off.
c. I wish that kind of animal would stay out of my garden.
Inherent to the semantics of demonstrative that is the individual ‘that’, the salient
object that is indicated. To access the kind/degree-level entity the indicated object
instantiates, demonstrative that receives the semantics in (27).
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(27) [[that]] = λA. ιy[A(y) ∧ ∪y(that)]
where A is a set of individuals, either nominalized properties or objects,
and that is the salient object indicated in the use of the demonstrative
The ∪-operator in the semantics of that predicativizes the individuals its argument
denotes, which allows them to apply to the specified object that. When that com-
poses with a set of nominalized properties, kinds or degrees, it returns the nominal-
ized property instantiated by the indicated object.
In (25), the appropriate degree is accessed by first identifying the relevant apples
(i.e., by establishing a pointer to them with that) and then picking out the degree
that applies to these apples. Suppose the relevant apples comprise the object a+b+c,
and that the weight of a+b+c is na+b+c (i.e., µkg(a+b+c) = na+b+c):
(28) [[that]]([[amount of apples]])
= [[that]](λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)])
= ιy[λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)](y) ∧ ∪y(that)]
= ιy[λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)](y) ∧ ∪y(a+b+c)]
= ∩λx. µkg(x) = na+b+c ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)
The result references a degree: a nominalized quantity-uniform set of apples; ev-
erything in that set evaluates to na+b+c with respect to the kilogram measure; all of
the quantities of apples have the same weight. For this degree to compose with the
structure that embeds it, Generalized DKP type-shifts the nominalized property for
object-level argument slots, quantifying over objects that instantiate the degree.
(29) [[John bought that amount of apples]]
= bought(∩λx. µkg(x) = na+b+c ∧ pi(APPLE)(x))(John)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[∪(∩λx. µkg(x) = na+b+c ∧ pi(APPLE)(x))(y) ∧ bought(y)(John)]
= ∃y[µkg(y) = na+b+c ∧ ∪APPLE(y) ∧ bought(y)(John)]
Here is the EXISTENTIAL interpretation: (29) asserts that John bought some apples
equal in weight to the salient apples indicated by that.
To see that this semantics for demonstrative that applies in the same fashion for
kinds, consider the derivation in (30). Assume that the indicated dog, b, is a beagle.
(30) John bought that kind of dog.
a. [[that kind of dog]]
= [[that]](λk. SUBKIND f (DOG)(k)
= ιy[(λk. SUBKIND f (DOG)(k))(y) ∧ ∪y(b)]
= ∩λx. *beagle(x) (= BEAGLE)
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b. [[John bought that kind of dog]]
= bought(∩λx. *beagle(x))(John)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[∪(∩λx. *beagle(x))(y) ∧ bought(y)(John)]
The sentence in (30) asserts that John bought some dog that belongs to the BEAGLE
kind, that is, that John bought a beagle. The semantics for demonstrative that in
(27) thus delivers the EXISTENTIAL interpretation for both degrees and kinds.
Verifying that nothing is lost in this new semantics for that, consider its more
basic uses. When that takes a simple predicate as an argument, as in that boy, it
returns the individual in the denotation of the predicate that is identical to the spec-
ified object that. In other words, when that takes a set of objects as an argument,
it returns the unique, salient object from this set. Key to this result is the way the
∪-operator predicativizes an object-level individual.
Applied an object a, ∪ shifts that object into a property. Using the IDENT oper-
ator from Partee 1987, the result is the property of being identical to a:
(31) Object predicativization:
∪a := IDENT(a) = λx. x = a
Suppose we have the boy a (i.e., Alan). Predicativizing a, ∪a, yields the property
of being identical to Alan. Thus, when that composes with a simple predicate as in
(32), it returns the unique individual identical to the specified object that. Simply
put, it returns the indicated object. This generalized semantics for that permits the
specification of individuals, both nominalized properties and real-world objects.
(32) a. [[boy]] = {a, b, c}
b. that = a
c. [[that boy]] = ιy[boy(y) ∧ ∪y(a)] = ιy[boy(y) ∧ IDENT(y)(a)] = a
3.2 Modifying degrees
Next, consider what happens with sets of degrees when they serve as arguments to
the definite determiner the. The denotes the maximality operator ι , composing with
a set and returning its maximal element (Sharvy 1980; Chierchia 1998; Zamparelli
1998). Chierchia (1998: 346, ex. (11a)) defines the ι-operator as in (33).
(33) ι A = the largest member of A if there is one (else, undefined)
This semantics allows the to compose with a set of degrees. These degrees are or-
dered on the basis of a measure, and the returns the largest degree. The derivation in
(34) illustrates this process; max stands for the largest possible value in the domain
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of the measure. The result has the amount of apples denote the maximal degree.
(34) a. [[amount of apples]] = λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µ f (x) = n ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)]
b. [[the(amount-of-apples)]] = ι λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µ f (x) = n∧ pi(APPLE)(x)]
[[the(amount-of-apples)]] = ∩λx. µ f (x) = max ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)
Unmodified, definite amount is often infelicitous. Awkwardness arises because
definite amount references a maximal degree, which in most circumstances will be
impossible to instantiate. For example, (35a) asserts that John bought some apples
that measure the maximal degree, that is, that he bought the totality of apples. To
be used felicitously, definite amount must be modified. Modification restricts the
set of degrees to just the relevant subset. In (35b), the degrees are restricted to those
that apply to the apples on the table; maximality selects the largest such degree.
(35) a. #John bought the amount of apples.
b. John bought the amount of apples on the table.
Under the EXISTENTIAL reading, (35b) asserts that John bought some apples equal
in amount to the apples on the table. If there are three kilograms of apples on the
table, then (35b) asserts that John bought three kilograms of apples. But how does
the PP on the table restrict amount of apples to just those apple-degrees that apply
to the objects on the table? Consider the ingredients of this modification.
Take the NP amount of apples, a set of degrees as in (36a). To this NP adjoins
the PP on the table, a set of objects as in (36b). The structure in (36c) results.
(36) a. [[amount of apples]] = λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µ f (x) = n ∧ pi(APPLE)(x)]
b. [[on the table]] = λx. on-table(x)
c. [DP the [NP [NP amount of apples] [PP on the table]]]
To derive the EXISTENTIAL reading of (35b), the maximal NP in (36c) must de-
note a set of apple degrees restricted to just those degrees that apply to objects on
the table. As was the case when nominalized properties served as arguments to
object-level predicates, here this restriction involves existential quantification over
instances of the de-nominalized properties. In other words, a set of degrees com-
poses with a set of individuals via point-wise application of Generalized DKP. This
restrictive, existential modification is defined as in (37); the derivation for (35b)
appears in (38). Note that composing the modified set of degrees with maximal the
adds the restriction as a presupposition on this degree set.
(37) Existential Modification (version 1):
A〈d,t〉
⋂
P〈e,t〉 = λd. A(d) ∧ ∃y[P(y) ∧
∪d(y)]
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(38) John bought the amount of apples on the table.
a. [[the amount of apples on the table]]
= the [λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µ f (x) = n ∧ pi(APPLES)(x)]]
⋂
[λx. on-table(x)]
via Existential Modification
= the [λd. ∃n[(d = ∩λx. µ f (x) = n ∧ pi(APPLES)(x)) ∧
∃y[on-table(y) ∧ ∪d(y)]]
= ∩λx: ∃y[µ f (y) = max ∧ pi(APPLES)(y) ∧ on-table(y)].
µ f (x) = max ∧ pi(APPLES)(x)
b. [[John bought the amount of apples on the table]]
= bought(the-amount-of-apples-on-the-table)(John)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[∪(the-amount-of-apples-on-the-table)(y) ∧
bought(y)(John)]
By making use of maximality in the semantics of the and type adjustment via Gen-
eralized DKP, the sentence in (38) asserts that John bought some apples equal in
amount to the apples that are on the table. These tools, all of them independently
justified, thus deliver the EXISTENTIAL interpretation for modified amount. By re-
stricting the degrees denoted by amount, its use suddenly describes a much more
plausible state of affairs: In (38), John buys a subset of the totality of apples.
Another common means to modify amount (and degrees) is relativization. First,
a word of caution: The name ‘amount relative’ (sometimes ‘degree relative’) often
indicates a peculiar class of there-existentials that ostensibly flout the Definiteness
Restriction (Milsark 1974; Carlson 1977a; Heim 1987; Grosu & Landman 1998).
These constructions are analyzed presently. For now, the aim is true amount rela-
tives: relative clauses headed overtly by amount, as in (39).
(39) John ate the amount of apples that you ate.
Under the EXISTENTIAL reading, (39) asserts that John ate some apples equal in
amount to the apples the addressee ate. At the level of the relative CP, suppose there
is degree abstraction. What precipitates this abstraction will depend on the analysis
of relative clause syntax. For example, under a head-external approach (Montague
1974; Partee 1975; Chomsky 1977), an operator will move to the specifier of the
relative CP, binding a degree trace in object position. Under a raising approach
(Åfarli 1994; Kayne 1994), the relative head amount of apples will originate as the
object in the relative CP, and then move to a CP-external position, binding its trace.
For present purposes, suppose merely that (39) receives the simplified LF in (40).
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(40) John ate [DP the [NP [NP amount of apples] [CP λd (that) you ate d]]]
a. λd. ate(d)(you) ⇒ via DKP⇒ λd. ∃x[ate(x)(you) ∧ ∪d(x)]
b. λd. amount-of-apples(d) ∧ ∃x[ate(x)(you) ∧ ∪d(x)]
The denotation of the relative CP appears in (40a). Note that the object-level predi-
cate ate composes with the degree variable via DKP, such that the CP denotes the
set of degrees true of things eaten by the addressee. The relative head, amount of
apples, also denotes a set of degrees (as in (36a)). Simple intersective modification
composes these two sets of degrees, such that the result, (40b), denotes a set of
apple degrees true of things eaten by the addressee. Maximality selects the largest
such degree—the maximum apple degree eaten by the addressee—and DKP allows
this degree to compose with the matrix predicate. The EXISTENTIAL interpretation
results: John ate an instance of the maximal apple degree true of something the
addressee ate. Therefore, he ate the same amount of apples the addressee ate.
Now for so-called ‘amount’ or ‘degree’ relatives, as in (41).
(41) John bought the apples that / Ø / *which there were on the table.
First, a description: degree relatives are relative clauses introduced by that or the
null relativizer Ø; they participate in existential constructions, ostensibly flouting
the Definiteness Restriction (Milsark 1974; Heim 1987), which would otherwise
prohibit individual variables from the gapped position in (41). Next, a claim: degree
relatives involve degree abstraction over the gapped position of the relative CP. Note
that both degrees and kinds avoid the Definiteness Restriction, as demonstrated in
(42) (Heim 1987). Supporting this claim, wh-form relativizers do not permit degree
or kind abstraction, which is why they cannot participate in degree relatives. In
(43), an EXISTENTIAL interpretation fails with which, resulting in anomaly.
(42) a. *Which food truck is there in Austin?
b. How many food trucks are there in Austin?
c. What kind of food trucks are there in Austin?
(43) a. John ate the amount of apples that / #which you ate.
b. John ate the kind of apples that / #which you ate.
And now, a correction: Heim (1987) uses the preferred EXISTENTIAL interpretation
of the sentence in (44) to motivate an analysis of degree relatives under which the re-
sulting DP denotes a degree.7 This analysis has been adopted in the literature, with
Grosu & Landman (1998) providing a compositional account of the phenomenon.
7 For now, simply note that based on the description above, (44) does not feature a degree relative—it
lacks an existential construction. Heim’s parse likely results from an implied amount, aligning the
relative clause in (44) with true amount relatives.
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(44) It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne that they spilled
that evening.
However, as Grosu & Landman themselves note, a degree relative does not refer-
ence a degree: the apples that there were on the table refers to the apples that were
on the table, not an abstract amount (i.e., a degree that applies to them). For (41) to
be true, John must have bought the apples on the table, not any apples measuring
the same as the apple on the table. An EXISTENTIAL interpretation fails for (41)
because a degree relative does not denote a degree. Rather than retrieving objects
from the degree referenced by a degree relative (the approach pursued by Grosu &
Landman), a degree relative should reference objects directly.
Independently-motivated tools deliver this result. Two factors are crucial: de-
gree abstraction in the relative CP, and Generalized DKP. With the simplified LF in
(46), the head apples composes with the relative CP, a set of degrees true of things
on the table. This composition, between a set of objects and a set of degrees, pro-
ceeds via Existential Modification. The modification is head driven as in (45) (cf.
(37)), such that the result in (46) is a set of apples restricted by the set of degrees. A
set of degrees modified by a set of objects begets a restricted set of degrees, while
a set of objects modified by a set of degrees begets a restricted set of objects.
(45) Existential Modification (final version):
A〈d,t〉
⋂
P〈e,t〉 := λd. A(d) ∧ ∃x[P(x) ∧
∪d(x)]
P〈e,t〉
⋂
A〈d,t〉 := λx. P(x) ∧ ∃d[A(d) ∧
∪d(x)]
(46) [[apples λd (that) there were d on the table]]
= λx. apples(x)
⋂
λd: ∪d(x) ∧ on-table(x)
via Existential Modification
= λx. apples(x) ∧ ∃d′[(λd. ∃y[∪don-table(y)])(d′) ∧ ∪d′(x)]
By tracking the objects that instantiate them, degrees-as-kinds yield degree relatives
without added machinery: the head (e.g., apples) is a set of individuals, the relative
CP a set of degrees; point-wise DKP via Existential Modification allows these two
sets to compose, and the result has a degree relative reference objects directly.
4 Discussion
Degree nouns like amount yield EXISTENTIAL interpretations; so do kind and kinds:
(47) a. John drank that amount of wine every day for a year.
→֒ every day for a year there was some wine measuring the same
amount (e.g., 1 liter) that John drank
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b. John drank that kind of wine every day for a year.
→֒ every day for a year there was some wine of the same kind (e.g.,
Burgundy) that John drank
Kinds are the nominalizations, or individual correlates of properties. In episodic
sentences, predicates acquire existential force via a type shift that allows them to
compose with kind-denoting arguments. Conceived of as kinds, degrees are han-
dled by the same semantic machinery: Generalized DKP quantifies over the objects
instantiating nominalized properties, delivering the EXISTENTIAL interpretation.
The properties that beget degrees are quantity-uniform, formed on the basis
of a measure. Not only does this re-conception of degrees as kinds deliver the
EXISTENTIAL interpretation with independently motivated tools, it also predicts
the striking similarity in behavior between degrees and kinds (e.g., degree relatives
and quantificational adverbs, Zamparelli 1998; questions, Heim 1987; and other
cross-categorial parallels, Anderson &Morzycki 2012). They behave alike because
degrees are kinds. More precisely, both are nominalized properties.
A final note is in order: most degree-based approaches to gradability assume
simple degrees-as-points (e.g., Kennedy 1999). Degrees enter into the ontology as
abstract entities; they are points (or intervals) ordered along some dimension. In
other words, degrees are numbers tagged with information about the dimension to
which they pertain (e.g., height, width, cost, beauty, etc.). Along a given dimen-
sion, the set of ordered degrees constitutes a scale. Scales provide the structure for
comparison: by establishing a correspondence between individuals and degrees, in-
dividuals get mapped onto scales; the relative position of these individuals on the
scale determines the outcome of comparison. The current notion of degrees-as-
kinds merely enriches traditional conceptions. Nothing is lost by this move, and
this paper spells out just a portion of what is gained.
To see that degrees-as-kinds translate straightforwardly into standard theories
of gradability, consider the two denotations for the gradable predicate in (48). The
first, (48a), treats degrees as simple points and has lexical predicates establish the
correspondence between individuals and degrees directly (Kennedy 1999; see also
Seuren 1973; Cresswell 1976; von Stechow 1984; Heim 1985). Put differently,
the predicate in (48a) itself performs measurement. The second, (48b), adopts the
degrees-as-kinds approach. Both denotations deliver the same result: a person is,
say, five feet tall just in case her height measures at least five feet. However, with
degrees-as-kinds, measurement becomes the job of degrees, not of gradable predi-
cates (a state of affairs Wellwood (2014) counts as a desirable result).
(48) a. [[tall]] = λdλx. µtall(x) ≥ d
b. [[tall]] = λdλx: d is appropriate for height. ∃d′[d′ ≥ d ∧ ∪d′(x)]
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A host of additional issues arise within the domain of degree semantics, but for now
it suffices to hint at the way that degrees-as-kinds behave within this framework. In
addition to losing nothing with respect to standard theories of gradability, degrees-
as-kinds capture the parallels in behavior between degrees and kinds, and the at first
surprising EXISTENTIAL interpretation now falls out as a prediction of the theory.
All that was required was a recognition of the seemingly exceptional behavior of
amount and its striking similarity with kind.
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